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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR
PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
ANTHONY PEIRSON XAVIER BOTHWELL*
ABSTRACT
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, inspired by the “four free-
doms” articulated by Franklin D. Roosevelt, proclaims but does not de-
fine the religious liberty that is the birthright of all people. Four centuries
ago, when few people were free, religious ideas fostered the development
of some of the fundamental principles of the law of nations. As interna-
tional law has matured, increasingly it has recognized the right of indi-
viduals and groups to pursue their own religions and beliefs. The United
Nations system has generated an array of international conventions, cov-
enants, and resolutions which today articulate the rights of adherents to
all sects and no sect. Religious freedom – sometimes used as shorthand
for freedom of religion, belief, and conscience, is spelled out in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1981 Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief, and other progeny of the U.N. Charter. Regional-
level agreements have addressed religious rights, but regional tribunals
such as the European Court of Human Rights have not been as discerning
as they should be in dealing with cases involving headscarves, missiona-
ries and other issues. The United States, despite its strong constitutional
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tradition and generally good enforcement of First Amendment rights, has
not consistently interpreted freedom of religion in a manner conformance
with international standards. For decades the Supreme Court and Con-
gress went back and forth on trying to arrive at a formula on protection
of religious minorities adversely affected by facially neutral laws. Presi-
dent Trump’s actions against immigrants and visitors from Muslim coun-
tries are a tragic departure from the values that were espoused by the
American leaders since the founding of the Republic.
I. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
WITHOUT DEFINITION
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),1 adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1948, was a breakthrough in estab-
lishing formal worldwide recognition of religious and other freedoms.2 It
proclaimed “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family.”3 It called for “freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want,”4 to be enjoyed “without distinction of any kind, such as
. . . religion.”5 And it demanded action: “All States shall take effective
measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on grounds of religion
or belief . . . .”6
In a key provision, UDHR Article 18 declares:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes the right to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.7
Produced by a Commission to Study the Organization of Peace chaired
by Eleanor Roosevelt,8 the UDHR, the Universal Declaration, was in-
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III),
art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
2. Derek H. Davis, The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: Exam-
ining the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intoler-
ance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, BYU L. REV. 217, 227 (2002) (“in terms
of its path-breaking qualities, the Universal Declaration would undoubtedly be the most important”).
3. UDHR pmbl.
4. Id.
5. Id. art. 2.
6. Id. art. 4(1).
7. Id. art. 18.
8. BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION 70 (1996).
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spired by the 1941 State of the Union speech of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt.9
II. RELIGION, HISTORICALLY IMPOSED IN DISREGARD OF
INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE, LATER FOSTERED
INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHICH EVENTUALLY
PROCLAIMED THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE
As I will delineate in this paper, international law has much to say about
religion, but the term religion itself is not really defined in international
law.10 It commonly is understood that religion involves the exercise of
conscience in teaching and other activities traditionally associated with
institutions of faith.11 And religion encompasses not only the voice ema-
nating from one’s conscience but also outer manifestations can encom-
pass regimens of ceremony, diet, attire, ritual, and language.12
The freedom of religion today is regarded as a basic human right, not
merely a boundary area for tolerance that is ceded by civil authority.13
But, it was not always so. The 1555 Religious Peace of Augsburg had
asserted the maxim cuius region, eius religio – “each prince determines
9. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 6,
1941) (“four essential human freedoms,” including “freedom of every person to worship God in his
own way,” to be attained “everywhere in the world,” along with freedom of speech, freedom from
fear, and “freedom from want”), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16092 (last
visited Apr. 29, 2018).
10. Robert Taer, “Religion” in International Law, RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (“Interna-
tional law, in fact, does not define religion. It simply uses the word to refer to what countries mean
by religion.”), http://www.religionhumanrights.com/Research/religion.intlaw.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2018).
11. Ahmad Masum & Nehaluddin Ahmad, Freedom of Religion and Apostasy under Interna-
tional Law: With Special Reference to Article 11 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution,.6 J. E.
ASIA & INT’L L. 435, 436 (2013) (referencing UDHR Art. 18 and ICCPR Art. 18) (“Although
international law does not define religion, it does identify religion with conscience . . . . Religion
may involve teaching, practice, worship, and observance.”); see CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA (re-
print Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/my/my063en.pdf (last
visited May 8, 2018).
12. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 on the freedom of thought, con-
science and religion, art. 18, para. 4, July 30, 1993 (“The observance and practice of religion or
belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary
regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or had coverings, participation with rituals associated
with certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language, customarily spoken by a group.”).
13. LOUIS HENKIN, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 639 (2d ed. 1999) (footnote omitted) (“Religious
liberty . . . must be distinguished from religious tolerance. Tolerance as a legal concept is premised
on the assumption that the state has ultimate control over religion and the churches, and whether and
to what extent religious freedom will be granted is a matter of state policy. The right of religious
liberty is a fundamental right, the essence of which is the right to entertain such beliefs as a person
chooses, the right to declare such beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the
right to manifest such belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.”).
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the religion of his subjects.”14 The Augsburg maxim implied that the
only person who really had freedom of religion was the prince.
As John Stuart Mill surmised, civil authorities who claimed to receive
divine revelation actually relied on messages from fellow mortals.15 He
had no sympathy for authorities who effectuated “the tyranny of the ma-
jority.”16 Relying undoubtedly on his own conscience, Mill championed
the idea that, if justice is to prevail, non-Christians must be treated the
same as Christians.17 He took the cynical view that people are naturally
intolerant,18 and said that religious fervor fosters hate.19
In most societies, most people have tended to be intolerant of the relig-
ious views of others – the exceptional tolerant being indifferent more
often than appreciating the virtues of a pluralistic society. Whether peo-
ple have tolerant views or not, whether they are indifferent to or embrace
diversity, any system of civil law in an enlightened world must accept
the equal rights of people of every religion and of no religion. And yet a
public servant, whether having received a communique´ from God or not,
is obliged to act on the basis of the public interest, respecting the equal
rights of those who subscribe to every sect or no sect. International law,
rightly conceived, promises that much.
Actually, international law does owe much of its formative development
to religious thought.20 The Jesuit priest Francisco Suarez, writing DE
LEGIBUS, AC DEO LEGISLATORE in 1612, asserted that “there is
some form of natural law” and that “the law of nature is rational nature
14. Id.
15. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (“It remains to be
proved that society or any of it any of its officers holds commission from on high to avenge any
supposed offense to Omnipotence which is not also a writing to our fellow creatures.”).
16. Id. at 4 (“Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and still is vulgarly,
held in dread, chiefly operating through the acts of the public authorities.”).
17. Id. at 49 (“If Christians would teach infidels to be just to Christianity, they should them-
selves be just to infidelity.”).
18. JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 15, at 8 (“Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in
whatever they really care about that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized,
except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quar-
rels, has added its weight to the scale.”).
19. Id. at 7 (“the odium theologicum. . .in a sincere bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases
of moral feeling”).
20. Mark Weston Janis, Religion and International Law, 7 AM. SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Nov.
17, 2002) (“From its earliest days, international law has been intertwined with religion. The 16th
Century Spanish Catholic priests, Suarez and Vitoria, who are often viewed as among the founders
of the modern discipline of international law, argued from religious sources that the Spanish crown
was obliged to treat native Americans as real peoples under the moral influence of the law of na-
tions.”), available at https://asil.org/insights/volume/7/issue/13/religion-and-international-law.
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itself.”21 Further: “Jurists usually distinguish the natural law from the ius
gentium [law of nations],” Suarez reported, “in that the natural law is
shared in common with brute creation, while the ius gentium is peculiar
to men.”22 Another priest, Francisco de Vitoria, in 1696 endorsed the just
war concept and referred to “the unlawfulness of the slaughter of chil-
dren and other innocent parties . . . .”23 Hugo Grotius, Protestant scholar
also regarded as a founder of international law, likewise derived from the
Bible rules to govern the conduct of nations.24
III. CHARTER REQUIRES NATIONS TO GUARANTEE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A nation, like a religion, depends on people who believe in it.25 At the
conclusion of World War II, the leaders of nations around the world
formed a common belief in the need for a global rule of law, to outlaw
war and safeguard human rights. The United Nations Charter,26 adopted
in 1945, established a system for international peace and security. Signif-
icantly, the Charter also sought to promote “respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion.”27 The Charter is in effect “the constitution of the
international community.”28 Addressing the closing session of the San
Francisco conference in which the Charter was signed, President Harry S
Truman (who was adamant about never putting a period after his middle
initial) said, “The Charter is dedicated to the achievement and obser-
vance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unless we can attain
those objectives for all men and women everywhere—without regard to
21. FRANCISCO SU ´AREZ, DE LEGIBUS, AC DEO LEGISLATORE 178 (Gwadys L. Williams, Ammi
Brown, & John Waldron trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1612).
22. Id. at 327.
23. FRANCISCO DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 181 (Classics of Inter-
national Law Series ed., J. Bate trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1917).
24. Janis, supra note 20 (“Another founder of international law, the Dutch Protestant jurist,
Hugo Grotius, relied heavily on Old and New Testament citations to demonstrate a universal law of
nations. . . . Though Grotius depended on Christian texts for his proofs, he felt that much of the law
of nations bound not only Christian states, but those of Islam and China, too.”).
25. See MICHAL ROZYNEK, A PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONHOOD AND THE MODERN SELF 29 (2017)
(citing SLAVOJ ˇZI ˇZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HAEL AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY
201 (1993)).
26. U.N. Charter (signed June 26, 1945, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, ratified by U.S. Aug.
8, 1945).
27. U.N. Charter art. 55(c); see RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 41 (1979) (“The Charter . . . furnishes considerable
content to the notion of human rights.”).
28. See Tahzib, supra note 8, at 66.
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race, language or religion-we cannot have permanent peace and
security.”29
The international human rights provisions of the Charter, including the
guarantee of freedom of religion, are generally regarded as “legally bind-
ing international obligations on its Member States.”30
The U.N. Charter and the international system it introduced in 1945 were
the consequence of worldwide revulsion at the horrors of world war and
the Holocaust.31 The Charter was followed within three years by the
adoption of the Genocide Convention,32 regarded as “a milestone for the
recognition of the right of religious groups to exist as groups . . . .”33
This convention criminalized genocide,34 which it defines to include kill-
ing, seriously injuring, or attempting to destroy “a national, ethnical, ra-
cial or religious group.”35
IV. CONVENTIONS, COVENANTS AND DECLARATIONS
AFFIRM RIGHTS OF PEOPLE OF EVERY FAITH AND
BACKGROUND, IN WAR AND PEACE
Many international instruments, progeny of the Charter, have incorpo-
rated the rights of religion, belief, and conscience in proclaiming the lib-
erty of people in every station and circumstance of life.
The Genocide Convention was followed a year later by the Geneva Con-
vention36 that protects wartime rights of civilians, including “respect for
their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions
and practices, and their manners and customs.”37
29. Harry S Truman, Address at the Closing Session of the United Nations Conference (June
26, 1945), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12188 (last visited Apr. 29, 2018).
30. Tahzib, supra note 8, at 68 n.18 (relying on HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147-49 (1950), and on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21)).
31. KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACH 527 (2011).
32. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
G.A. Res. 260 (III) A, (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (entered into force Jan. 12,
1951, ratified by U.S. Nov. 25, 1988).
33. Tahzib, supra note 8, at 96.
34. Genocide Convention, supra note 32, art. I.
35. Id. art. II.
36. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 27, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, ratified by U.S. Feb. 2, 1956).
37. Id. art. 27.
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In 1951, still reacting to the Holocaust as well as postwar migrations, the
international community adopted a convention for the protection of refu-
gees facing religious or other persecution.38 The Refugee Convention
mandates, “The Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their
territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their na-
tionals with respect to freedom to practice their religion and freedom as
regards the religious education of their children.”39
A convention adopted by the U.N. International Labour Organization in
195740 declared that signatories must take steps to protect their indige-
nous populations while taking “due account” of their “cultural and relig-
ious values.”41
The U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization adopted in
1960 a convention prohibiting discrimination in education.42 It defines
discrimination to include “any distinction, exclusion, limitation or prefer-
ence which, being based on . . . religion . . . has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the quality of treatment in education . . . .”43
Religious and other rights of individuals took a significant step forward
with the 1966 adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR),44 which is legally binding on states parties.45 It says
plainly in Article 18: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
38. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 429 (V), Dec. 14, 1950, (entered
into force Apr. 22, 1954, reprinted in U.N. Docs. HCR/INF/29/Rev. 4, at 11-36 (1981). The Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967 gave universal coverage to the substantive provisions of
the Convention. See the Protocol, G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Oct. 4,
1967, ratified by U.S. Nov. 1, 1968).
39. Id. art. 4.
40. Convention No. 107 concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957 (entered into force June
2, 1959, not ratified by U.S.), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C107. Convention No. 107 was updated
by Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June
27, 1989 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991, not ratified by U.S.), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169.
41. Id. art. 4(a).
42. Convention against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered
into force May 22, 1962, not ratified by U.S.).
43. Id. art. 1.
44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; ratified by U.S. June 8, 1992).
45. Davis, supra note 2 (“in terms of . . . enforceability in the courts, the 1966 Covenant would
be the most important”); see also Javaid Rehman, Accommodating Religious Identities in an Islamic
State: International Law, Freedom of Religion and the Rights of Religious Minorities, 7 INT’L J. ON
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 139, 144 (2000).
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thought, conscience and religion.”46 The promised freedom is spelled out
as including a person’s right “to have or adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, obser-
vance, practice and teaching.”47 This language is broad enough to en-
compass all forms of religion and analogous belief systems.48
According to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), Arti-
cle 18 of the ICCPR is understood to protect “theistic, non-theistic and
atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or be-
lief.”49 Expressing concern about “any tendency to discriminate against
any religion or belief for any reason, the HRC construes ICCPR Article
18 to protect religions and beliefs that are new “or represent religious
minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a predomi-
nant religious community.”50
Some scholars, when addressing “absolute” religious freedom, fail to
specify that what is absolutely free pertains to that which is in a person’s
mind or heart, as distinct from overt activity that can be subject to rea-
sonable regulation by civil authority. That analytical shortcoming was
evident, for example, when Miner wrote, referring to the ICCPR, “The
plain language of Article 18 suggests that the right to freedom of relig-
ion, including the freedom to have, alter, or adopt a religion of one’s
choice, is an absolute right which may not be restricted.”51 Legal histori-
ans say that some of those who were involved in the drafting of the
article used such words as “absolute,” “sacred,” and “inviolable” to char-
acterize the liberty being protected.52 It was recognized, however, that
there is a legally significant difference between faith or opinion on the
one hand53 and practice or conduct on the other hand.54 As John Stuart
46. ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 18.
47. Id.
48. Johan D. Vyver, Limitations of Freedom of Religion or Belief: International Law Perspec-
tives, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 506 (2005) (footnote omitted) (ICCPR “Article 18. . .[is] not
limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs which traditional charac-
teristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions.”).
49. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, art. 18(2), 48th Sess., July 30, 1993,
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1,  at 35 (1994), General Comment ICCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add. 4 (Sept. 27, 1993) [hereinafter General Comment No. 22], available at http://
www.refworld.org/docid/453883fb22.html.
50. Id.
51. Christopher J. Miner, Losing My Religion: Austria’s New Religion Law in Light of Interna-
tional and European Standards of Religious Freedom, 1998 BYU L. REV. 607, 627 (1998).
52. HENKIN, supra note 13.
53. Id. (“It was agreed that no restrictions of legal character could be imposed upon a person’s
inner thought or moral consciousness, or his attitude towards the universe or its creator. . . .”).
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Mill long ago discerned, “belief” consists of one’s inner thoughts, re-
gardless of subject matter, and is not subject to control or regulation by
civil authority.55
Although “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” must broadly be
construed, freedom does not mean unrestrained license. “Freedom to
manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others,” as
ICCPR Article 18 provides.56
The year 1966 heralded the adoption of not only the ICCPR but also a
convention on economic, social, and cultural rights (ICESCR),57 to be
observed without discrimination on account of religion, political or other
opinion, or other status.58 The UDHR, the ICCPR (and its two original
protocols59), and the ICESCR are considered to be “the five constituent
parts of the International Bill of Human Rights.”60 This fulfills a forecast
by President Truman who said when the U.N. Charter was adopted,
“Under this document we have good reason to expect the framing of an
international bill of rights . . . as much a part of international life as our
own Bill of Rights is a part of our Constitution.”61
The Universal Declaration, UDHR, as a General Assembly resolution,
articulates fundamental rights but does not does not per se make them
54. Ted Stankhe, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human
Rights Law, BYU L. REV. 251, 261 (1999) (“While international human rights instruments recognize
the right to have religious beliefs and the freedom to act on them, these instruments also confirm that
states can limit this freedom to act in order to ensure other specified interests.”); See also HENKIN,
supra note 52, at 217 (“Choice between competing rights involves particular complexities in respect
of freedom of religion. . . . The free exercise of religion sometimes claims exception from general
rules, including some rules that protect the rights of others.”).
55. MILL, supra note 15, at 9. (“The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amend-
able to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his indepen-
dence is, of course, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.”).
56. ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 18(3).
57. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, signed by U.S. Oct. 5, 1977).
58. Id. art. 2(2).
59. See Summary: International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, CAN. CIV. LIBERTIES
ASS’N (ICCPR’s first optional protocol allows victims of human rights violations to be heard; the
second seeks to abolish the death penalty), https://ccla.org/summary-international-covenant-on-civil-
and-political-rights-iccpr/ (last visited May 1, 2018).
60. Tahzib, supra note 8, at 69.
61. See Truman, supra note 29.
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legally enforceable.62 The ICCPR and the ICESCR are multinational
agreements that are more detailed and spell out rights that the states par-
ties have a legal obligation to protect. Each nation has an obligation
before the international community to conform its laws and policies to
the human rights protections of the International Bill of Rights. Other
international conventions that proclaim religious and other rights of par-
ticular groups – noncombatants, migrants, indigenous people, etc. – also
create obligations that states owe to the community of nations. But, the
International Bill of Rights articulates an overarching array of rights that
belong to all members of the human community.
In 1981, a General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Be-
lief63 provided the most comprehensive statement on the subject.64 Al-
though the declaration does not have legally binding force in itself, it
does have value in that it may be used as an aid in interpreting the rele-
vant parts of the ICCPR.65 “Everyone shall have freedom of thought,
conscience and religion,” it declares.66 The declaration proclaims relig-
ious rights of parents67 and children,68 and asserts the right to maintain
places of worship, charitable and humanitarian institutions, and to pub-
lish, teach, receive contributions, and observe days of rest and holidays.69
It provides, “All States shall take effective measures to prevent and elim-
inate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief,”70 and calls for
national legislation to ensure that these rights shall be available in prac-
tice.71 The declaration does not presume that church and state are to be
62. Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of religion or Belief through the UN Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 487, 488
(1988).
63. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, art. 5(3) (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter Elimination of Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion].
64. Davis, supra note 2, at 227; see also Resources on Faith, Ethics and Public Life, GE-
ORGETOWN UNIV. BERKLEY CTR. (Nov. 25, 1981), https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publica-
tions/declaration-on-the-elimination-of-all-forms-of-intolerance-and-of-discrimination-based-on-
religion-or-belief.
65. Christian Walter, Religion or Belief, Freedom of, International Protection: (C.) The 1981
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief – Functions and Legal Relevance, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INT’L L., http://0-
opil.ouplaw.com.library.ggu.edu/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e867?
rskey=6rhK7w&result=1&prd=EPIL (last visited Dec. 5, 2018).
66. Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion, supra note 63, art. 1(1).
67. Id. art. 5(1).
68. Id. art. 5(2-5).
69. Id. art. 6(a)-(i).
70. Id. art. 4(1).
71. Id. art. 7.
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separated,72 although joining religion to the state implies discrimination
between faiths, favoring one over others. An official state religion, even
if approved by a majority of the population, means there is not truly a
level playing field or true equality of rights for people of all religions and
belief systems.
The Honorable Judge Carlos Bea of the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Ap-
peals contends that “psychoanalysis and personal feelings of effrontery”
should not be used by the courts “to put the brakes on democratically
approved governmental expressions of religion.”73 Instead, he suggests:
“In the future, the remedy for such emotional bruising may be at the
ballot box, rather than the courtroom.”74 However, the better view, more
consistent with international norms, is that fundamental rights of the in-
dividual are not to be derogated on the basis of either the ruler’s whim or
majority rule. As Fellmuth observes, “a state that adopts Islam as an offi-
cial religion not only violates the substantive right to freedom of religion,
it also discriminates against non-Muslims (and Muslims with dissenting
views or those who wish to live in a secular state).”75
The links between state and religion in many nations, as diverse as the
United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, make it impracticable to promulgate
a universal declaration that would call for a wall of separation between
church and state. It appears that this is one point on which universal
practice of nations has not become customary law.
A 1989 convention76 mandates that states “shall respect the rights of the
child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.77 The convention,
which gives binding legal force to some of the aspirations of the 1981
declaration, also provides that states shall respect parents’ rights “to pro-
vide direction . . . consistent with the evolving capacities of the child
. . . .”
78
 Child protective officers and family law judges should respect
the internationally protected rights of children and parents.
72. Sullivan, supra note 62, at 490.
73. Hon. Carlos Bea, Paper for the Sons of the American Revolution, San Francisco Chapter,
on U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning First Amendment prohibition of an “establishment of
religion” (2017) (on file with author).
74. Id.
75. AARON XAVIER FELLMETH, PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 182
(2016).
76. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Sept. 2, 1990, signed by U.S. Feb. 16, 1995).
77. Id. art. 14(a).
78. Id. art. 14(2).
11
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Another convention, adopted in 1990, affirms the right of migrant work-
ers and families to follow “a religion or belief of their choice,” free from
coercion.79
A Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities,80 adopted by General Assembly res-
olution in 1992, provides for the right of minorities to practice their own
religion81 and maintain contact with related groups everywhere.82 It also
requires steps to “encourage conditions for the promotion” of the “iden-
tity” of minorities within the state’s territory.83
A resolution passed by the General Assembly in 2000 reaffirmed that
discrimination based on religion or belief is “an affront to human dignity
and a disavowal of the principles of the Charter . . . .”84 It added that “all
Governments” have a duty “to counter intolerance and related violence
based on religion or belief, including practices of discrimination against
women and the desecration of religious sites . . . .”85 The resolution ex-
pressed “grave concern” about attacks on religious sites and urged all
states to take “utmost efforts” to protect such places.86
An underlying purpose of international measures in support of religious
liberty is to prevent not only destruction of property but also violence
against people. After all, religious extremism has unleashed violence
from the era of the Crusades to the era of 9/11.87 Addressing a disturbing
trend that is no less true today,88 the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
79. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Mem-
bers of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93. (entered into force July 1, 2003, not
ratified by U.S., Art. 12(2)).
80. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Lin-
guistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992).
81. Id. art. 2(1).
82. Id. art. 1(1).
83. Id.
84. Resolution on Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, G.A. res., 55/97, Dec. 4,
2000, http://www.un-documents.net/a55r97.htm (accessed June 13, 2018).
85. Id.
86. Id. para. 8.
87. David Llewellyn & H. Victor Conde´, Freedom of Religion or Belief under International
Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, 12 TRINITY L. REV. 39, 41 (2004) (“religion has
often been the definitive divisive element for disputes that degenerate into systemic violence of
terrorism, rebellions, revolutions, civil wars and both non-international and international armed
conflicts”).
88. See Erich Follath, Europe’s Capital of Anti-Semitism: Budapest Experiences a New Wave
of Hate, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/europe-s-capital-of-anti-
semitism-budapest-experiences-a-new-wave-of-hate-a-722880.html (last visited May 8, 2018); see
also Nilanjana Bhowmick, As India’s Muslims Are Lynched, Modi Keeps Silent, THE WASHINGTON
POST, June 28, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/06/28/as-in-
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observed in 2005, “the overall rise in instances of intolerance and vio-
lence directed against members of many religious communities in vari-
ous parts of the world, including cases motivated by Islamophobia, anti-
Semitism and Christianophobia . . . .”89 The Commission urged that eve-
ryone in government “cultivate respect for all religions or beliefs,
thereby promoting mutual understanding and tolerance.”90
Another U.N. body, the Human Rights Council, in 2007, called upon
states to adopt measures to “effectively guarantee the freedom of religion
or belief of women.”91
V. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BECOMES PART OF CUSTOMARY
LAW OF NATIONS
The religious liberty declared in the UDHR has acquired legally binding
force insofar as its precepts have been acknowledged through the cus-
tomary practice of nations worldwide. The primary sources of interna-
tional law are conventions, custom, and recognized general principles.92
Writings by the foremost academicians in the field are a subsidiary
source.93 In The Paquete Habana, customary international law was en-
forced by the United States Supreme Court even in the absence of a
treaty or congressional enactment – a renowned case that arose from U.S.
Navy seizure of Cuban fishing boats when the Spanish-American War
was about to begin.94
dias-muslims-are-killed-modi-keeps-silent/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d6b9c7ab640d; see also
Daryl Johnson, Holy Hate: The Far Right’s Radicalization of Religion, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (2018),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/holy-hate-far-right%E2%80%99s-
radicalization-religion.
89. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 2005/40 on Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, E/CN.4/RES/2005/40 (Apr. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/429c37774.html.
90. Id. at 8(c).
91. Human Rights Council, Res. 6/37, 9(c) (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/
Documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_6_37.pdf.
92. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, T.S. 993, available
at http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf (accessed June 13, 2018). But see Rumiana
Yotova, Challenges in the Identification of the ‘General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized
Nations’: The Approach of the International Court. (Aug. 1, 2017) (Univ. Of Cambridge Faculty of
Law Research Paper No. 38/2017) (decisions of courts and writings of the most qualified academi-
cians are subsidiary sources), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302
0190.
93. Id.
94. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 711 (1900). (“[B]y the general consent of the
civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an
established rule of international law” that noncombatant fishing vessels “are exempt from capture as
prize of war. . . . International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending on it are duly
13
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A majority of legal scholars in the field have concluded that the UDHR,
including its assertion of religion freedom, has become part and parcel of
customary international law.95 Machado advises that “national courts
would do well to take advantage of an existing jus commune [common
law], developed by the most influential and international courts, whose
core values are freedom of conscience and equality. Its formal corollaries
are the prohibition of coercion, persecution and discrimination in the
name of religion.”96
Sullivan, writing in 1988, contended, “There is no consensus on whether
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief already
constitutes a norm of customary law.”97 She suggested that, as the Decla-
ration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination
acquires “concrete material content through its implementation, it will
contribute to the acceptance of the customary law status . . . .”98 She
says, “The Declaration stands as a major advance in the development of
international norms . . . .”99
According to Higgins, “It is sometimes suggested that there can be no
fully universal concept of human rights, for it is necessary to take into
account the diverse cultures and political systems of the world”; it is her
view this idea is held mainly by states and some scholars but “rarely
advanced by the oppressed.”100 Enlightened legal scholars recognize that
the fundamental norms of human rights are part of the customary law of
nations.
presented for their determination. . . . Upon the facts proved . . . it is the duty of this court, sitting as
the highest prize court of the United States, and administering the law of nations, to declare and
adjudge that the capture was unlawful and without probable cause . . . .”) The use of the term
civilized in this context is problematic. In a regrettable fallacy, Eurocentric mentality used to deem
indigenous tribes uncivilized. Is any nation uncivilized? Surely the Taliban-ruled state was uncivi-
lized, but the Afghan people could not fairly be so characterized.
95. John P. Humphrey, The Revolution in International Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. 205
(1975) (footnote omitted) (“Most lawyers who have studied the matter – and I do not include writers
of text books who merely repeat what they have read elsewhere – now say that . . . the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is now part of the customary law of nations and therefore binding on
all states.”).
96. Jonatas E. M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 451, 477 (2004-2005).
97. Sullivan, supra note 62, at 488.
98. Id. at 488-89 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 518.
100. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT
96 (1994), quoted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 219 (1996).
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VI. GLOBAL TRIBUNALS HAVE MADE EFFORTS TO
PROTECT RELIGIOUS MINORITIES BUT SUCCESS HAS
BEEN LIMITED
Cases from the former Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia illustrate ef-
forts of global tribunals to enforce rights of people of diverse religious
backgrounds.
The PCIJ, under the League of Nations system, held that the German-
Polish Convention of May 15th, 1922, concerning Upper Silesia, did
give every national the right freely to declare that he “does or does not
belong to a racial, linguistic or religious minority” and to declare what is
the language of a “pupil or child for whose education he is legally
responsible.”101
In a verdict at The Hague, Dusko Tadic, citizen of the former Yugosla-
via, of Serb ethnic descent, resident of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina at the time of the crimes, was found guilty of persecutions and
beatings.102 The offenses included an attack on the Bosnian town of
Kozarac and its outlying villages where Tadic took part in the calling-out
of four Muslim men from a column of civilians, and the beatings, separa-
tion and forced transfer of non-Serb civilians.103
Sundararajan contends that “international law does very little work to-
ward protecting the right to free exercise of religion for minority commu-
nities outside the context of an armed conflict.”104 He says this is partly
due to “jurisdictional constraints placed on international tribunals,” and
he adds, “It is rare for a question concerning the exercise of religion to be
heard by a body like the ICC [International Criminal Court] or the ICJ
[International Court of Justice] outside the context of armed conflict, or
at least hostility. This lack of protection is also driven by the conceptual-
ization of religion as a communal right . . . .”105
101. Case Concerning the Rights of Minorities in Upper Selisia (Minority Schools) (Germ. v.
Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15 (Apr. 26), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/
decisions/1928.04.26_upper_silesia.htm.
102. Prosecutor v. Du[Ko Tadi] , Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-
tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Anagha Sundararajan, Religious Freedom and International Law: The Protection of Relig-
ious Minorities in International Tribunals 67 (2017) (University of Chicago Law School Interna-
tional Immersion Program Papers).
105. Id.
15
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The persecution of religious minorities in today’s world, from Malaysia
to the Middle East, reflects the fact that international tribunals generally
have been ineffectual in attempts to achieve the proclaimed objective of
universal freedom of religion. This state of affairs is a sad commentary
on the actual performance of the international legal system.
VII. INSTRUMENTS ADDRESS RELGIOUS RIGHTS ON THE
REGIONAL LEVEL
Minorities Treaties after World War I were entered between the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers (US, British Empire, France, Italy and Ja-
pan) and 14 “newly created or expanded states in Europe and the Middle
East (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iraq, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Yugosla-
via).106 These agreements governed eligibility for citizenship in the latter
states, granting religious and other minorities certain rights.107 The
League of Nations was to guarantee implementation but failed to do so
when there were mass killings of Jews in Ukraine, anti-Jewish violence
in Romania, and other anti-Semitic trends.108
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)109 provides, “No
one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to main-
tain or to change his religion or beliefs.”110 It also says, “Freedom to
manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the limitations
prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”111 Further,
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of conscience and religion.”112
Another instrument, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man, proclaims, “Every person has the right to freely profess a relig-
ious faith, and to manifest and practice it both in public and private.”113
106. Minority Treaties, THE YYIVO ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWS IN EASTERN EUROPE, http://
www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Minorities_Treaties.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, reprinted in NIHAL
JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 638 (2002), available at https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/
basic3.american%20convention.htm.
110. Id. art. 12(2).
111. Id. art. 12(3).
112. Id. art. 12(1).
113. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 3,
May 2, 1948 [hereinafter American Declaration], available at https://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/En-
glish/Basic2.american%20Declaration.htm.
16
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (ECHR) states:
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion
or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2.  Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others.114
Norway, upon the ratification of the ECHR, made a reservation to the
convention because the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 included a ban
on the Society of Jesus.115 Later, considering that its prohibition of the
Jesuit order was “anachronistic,” Norway amended the national constitu-
tion so as to conform to the ECHR and withdrew the reservation.116
Regional instruments are an attempt to foster practical recognition of uni-
versally recognized rights by states in the various parts of the world.
VIII. ATTIRE, CONVERSION, EVANGELISM CONFOUND
REGIONAL TRIBUNALS
Some authorities go to the extreme, over-regulating or prohibiting relig-
ious behavior that poses no threat to “safety, order, health, or morals” or
rights of anyone else. For example, the European Commission of Human
Rights, in Karaduman v. Turkey, decided that a university graduate could
not receive a provisional certificate of her qualifications because she re-
fused to be photographed with her head uncovered.117 The court rea-
soned that the scholar, by pursuing higher education in a secular
university, agreed to follow its rules.118 The Commission cited Article
9(2) regarding “protection of public order, health or morals,” etc.119
114. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
9, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR] (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
115. A. H. Robertson, The European Convention on Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 110 (Evan Luard ed., 1967) (footnote omitted).
116. Id.
117. Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993).
118. Id.
119. ECHR, supra note 114, art. 9(2).
17
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It would seem reasonable to regulate the wearing of a burqa, which cov-
ers the face as well as the body, when there is a legitimate basis for
surveillance such as in the secure area of an airline terminal or military
base. However, it is difficult to see how wearing a headscarf while pos-
ing for a university photograph would harm anyone’s safety, order,
health, morals, or other rights. If the argument be made that disorder
would ensue because others saw her photograph showing the headscarf,
it would seem more logical to find that those engaging in disorderly con-
duct should be disciplined, not the religious person who simply wants to
wear her headscarf when photographed. The European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) provides essentially the same standard as the
ICPPR.120 Yet, the Commission reasoned that pursuing studies in the
secular university constitutes agreement to the university’s rules, which
include submitting to be photographed with one’s head uncovered.121
Thus the tribunal decided the case on the basis of a rule of contract law,
not an interpretation of the human rights convention. However, a better
legal analysis would determine that, where the religious conduct poses
no harm to safety, order, etc., the guarantee of religious freedom should
take precedence over a contract rule. The Karaduman case has been cited
as reflecting an unfortunate trend in decisions by international tribunals
on the issue of attire as a form of religious expression.122
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Dahlab v. Switzer-
land, a 2001 case, decided that a primary school teacher barred from
wearing the hijab in class was not protected by ECHR Article 9.123 The
hijab, a scarf, covers the hair and neck but not the face. The court’s
decision was reached despite the fact that there had been no complaints
from any parents.124 The court based its reasoning on “the impact that a
powerful external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have
on the freedom of conscience and religion of very young children.”125
And yet the headscarf ban would seem “hard to square with the principle
120. Id. art. 9 (“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.”).
121. Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993).
122. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 161
(Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., 2010).
123. Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
124. Id.
125. Id.
18
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of gender equality” though the (weak) argument is made that it “might
have some kind of proselytizing effect.”126
The right (guaranteed in the ICCPR) to “have or adopt” a religion or
belief implies that one has the right to convert from one religion or belief
system to another.127 This tenet has been rejected by representatives of
some predominantly Muslim nations.128 Davis wrote:
Since Muslim law generally considers conversion from Islam to
any other religion to be an act of blasphemy, the Muslims ob-
jected to language in these instruments that would have made
converting from one religion to another an unqualified right.
Based on this belief, most Muslim regimes have little tolerance
for non-Muslim missionaries, viewing their proselytizing as en-
couraging Muslims to commit blasphemy.129
Hozapfel, seeing the dilemma, commented, “The difficulties inherent in
blasphemy laws have no solution if the belief in the equal human rights
freedom of religion and freedom of speech are also maintained.”130 In
the final analysis, the international norm requires protection of an indi-
vidual’s rights to follow, change, and express her own religious
convictions.
The European Commission of Human Rights (ECtHR) rendered a sensi-
ble finding in the case of Glavno Myuftiistvo v. Bulgaria that affirmed
“the right of believers and of the religious community to govern their
own affairs and to choose their leadership,” under Article 9 of the
ECHR.131 There, the Chief Mufti Office of the Bulgarian Muslims and
three individuals complained of “an interference with their religious lib-
erties, in that “measures undertaken by the State had the effect of replac-
126. See Law and Legal Cases, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP (Jan. 15, 2001), http://minori-
tyrights.org/law-and-legal-cases/dahlab-v-switzerland-2/.
127. General Comment No. 22, supra note 49 (“freedom to ‘have or adopt’ a religion or belief
necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s
current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain”).
128. Robert Taer, “Religion” in International Law, RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (“right to
give up her religion for a belief, or to change to a different religion. . .strongly contested by some
Muslim countries in the United Nations, who assert that no Muslim has the right to abandon Islam”),
http://www.religionhumanrights.com/Research/religion.intlaw.htm (last visited  Jan. 31, 2018).
129. Davis, supra note 2, at 229.
130. Caleb Hozapfel, Can I Say That: How an International Blasphemy Law Pits the Freedom
of Religion against the Freedom of Speech, 33 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 597, 646.
131. Glavno Myuftiistvo v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997), available at
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22glavno%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-
46071%22]}.
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ing the statute and the leadership of the Muslim religion in Bulgaria.”132
The Commission declared the application admissible.133
In another case, the European Court of Human Rights found “no breach
of Article 9” where Minos Kokkinakis, born into a Greek Orthodox fam-
ily in Crete, was arrested more than 60 times for proselytism after he
became a Jehovah’s Witness.134 The court conceded that generally “there
is no justification for the State to use its power ‘to protect’ the
proselytised,” and that “the ‘public order’ argument cannot justify use of
coercive State power in a field where tolerance demands ‘free argument
and debate.’”135 Nonetheless, the arrest of Kokkinakis was declared per-
missible.136 The court reasoned, “The persistent efforts of some fanatics
to convert others to their own beliefs by using unacceptable psychologi-
cal techniques on people, which amount in effect to coercion, cannot in
our view come within the ambit of the natural meaning of the term
‘teach.’”137 The ruling came notwithstanding the fact that the ECHR
says religious freedom includes the right to engage in “teaching,”138
which arguably should be understood to include a faith’s peaceful
evangelism.
Jayawickrama comments that “[t]he right to manifest one’s religion or
belief in teaching includes in principle the right to try to convince one’s
neighbor,” and says the European Court has distinguished between
“bearing Christian witness” and “improper proselytism.”139
The trend of religious freedom denied may be broader than rulings on
cases involving headscarves. In Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, the Eu-
ropean Commission on Human Rights held that a pacifist, who distrib-
uted leaflets urging soldiers not to go to Northern Ireland, was not
protected by Art. 9 of the ECHR.140 The Commission reasoned that the
leafleting “did not constitute a ‘practice’ of pacifism, but rather political
opposition to. . .government policy.”141 According to the Arrowsmith
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397 (1993).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. ECHR, supra note 114, art. 9(1) (and associated text).
139. NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 638, 655 (2002), available at https://
www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm.
140. Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur. Comm’n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5
(1978).
141. Id.
20
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formula, the leafleting was not “necessary” in order for the applicant to
practice her religion, but “simply inspired by religious motives or
beliefs.”142
A better legal analysis might have concluded that a religious person
whose faith compelled her to express such opposition to the Troubles in
Northern Ireland was exercising free speech that was, for her, an exercise
of religious duty that should be protected by international law.
IX. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT STRUGGLES WITH
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION TO FACIALLY NEUTRAL LAWS,
AND OTHER ISSUES
United States Supreme Court decisions implicating religious freedom
generally are unpredictable, as these issues tend to be decided on the
basis of very case-specific analysis. Federal law in the realm of religious
liberty sometimes is the subject of conflicted policy goals and interplay
between the high court and Congress. A series of developments over the
span of years from 1963 to 2000 reveals the push and pull between the
judicial and legislative branches of the U.S. government on the subject,
what to do when a facially neutral statute impedes religious freedom.
In 1963 the Supreme Court, citing longstanding precedent, held in Sher-
bert v. Verner143 that a “neutral statute may not infringe religious free-
dom without strict scrutiny” (i.e., requires compelling government
interest and narrowly tailored measure).144 The alleged persecutor, to
prevail according to Sherbert, must prove nondiscriminatory intent, if
application of the “neutral” statute would infringe a complaining party’s
religious freedom.145 The court decided that unemployment benefits
would be paid to Sherbert not as a Seventh-Day Adventist but as an un-
employed worker. Consequently, the payments indirectly would benefit
her church, but not more than would the salary of any public employee,
according to the court’s rationale.146 Holding the Seventh-Day Adventist
immune from a state requirement to work on the Sabbath and therefore
entitled to receive certain unemployment benefits, the Supreme Court
explained, “Plainly enough, appellant’s conscientious objection to Satur-
142. Id.
143. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 412-13.
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day work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a
kind within the reach of state legislation.”147
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Smith reversed Sherbert out-
right.148 The judicial change of course meant that Smith, a Native Ameri-
can Indian who used peyote (a cactus-derived hallucinogen) in religious
ceremony, was found to be criminally liable under Oregon’s drug
laws.149
Modifying the rule it had enunciated, the Supreme Court in a split deci-
sion in INS v. Jairo Jonathan Elias Zacharias, in 1992, imposed an “in-
tent requirement.”150 This meant that a party claiming religious
exemption from a facially neutral state act may prevail by presenting
evidence of officials’ discriminatory intent.151
Members of Congress did not agree with the course the Supreme Court
was on. Exercising its power to make the laws, Congress enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,152 which reversed Smith and re-
stored the Sherbert rule. The statute itself said that “the compelling inter-
est test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests.”153 The act of Congress said its purpose was to
“to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Oregon v. Smith . . .
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of relig-
ion is substantially burdened; and . . . provide a claim or defense to per-
sons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government.”154
In a 1997 case, City of Boerne v. Flores,155 the Supreme Court justices,
disapproving of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, struck down the
federal act on constitutional grounds insofar as it applied to state and
local government.
Congress responded by enacting the Religious Land Use Act,156 which
requires strict scrutiny of facially neutral state laws impacting freedom of
147. Id. at 403.
148. Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
149. Id.
150. INS v. Jairo Jonathan Elias Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
151. Id.
152. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
156. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
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religion.157 This restored the Sherbert rule158 and restored the United
States to following the international norm of safeguarding religious lib-
erty. The religious exemption to facially neutral acts of federal and state
government stands, consistently with the Constitution and international
law.
Following a different track, the Supreme Court in the 1985 case of U.S.
v. Elder decided that “enforcement of criminal laws can be constitution-
ally achieved even if the laws interfere with the religious practices of
individuals.”159 The high court said it “cannot interfere with political de-
cisions which the United States as a sovereign nation chooses to make in
the interpretation, enforcement, or rejection of treaty commitments which
affect immigration.”160 On that rationale, the Elder court allowed the
criminal prosecution of an American Catholic who aided Salvadorans
illegally to enter United States.
Despite the imperfect and at times erratic U.S. record on protection of
religious freedom, Congress enacted a law called the International Relig-
ious Freedom Act of 1998, which declares that it is the policy of the
United States to support freedom of religion worldwide.161
On the side of religious freedom, the Supreme Court decided in Torcaso
v. Watkins that the State of Maryland may not require a notary public to
declare faith in God.162
On the side of sometimes denying religious freedom, the Supreme Court
in Gillette v. U.S. ruled that selective conscientious objection is not pro-
tected by the Constitution.163 According to the Court, “incidental burdens
felt by persons in petitioner’s position are strictly justified by substantial
governmental interests . . . in procuring the manpower necessary for mili-
tary purposes.”164 To the extent that this ruling conforms to current inter-
national law on the issue, I believe that international law should be
reformed to support the rights of the selective objector. Denying a sol-
dier’s right to refuse to participate in a war he deeply believes to be
immoral cannot be reconciled with the fundamental right to adhere to
one’s religion and conscience.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. U.S. v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
160. Id. at 1581.
161. International Religious Freedom Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6401 et seq. (1998).
162. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
163. Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
164. Id. at 462.
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X. TRUMP’S MUSLIM TRAVEL BAN IS AN ABERRATION
FROM COMMITMENT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
RULE OF LAW AFFIRMED BY FOUNDERS
The freedom of religion, belief, and conscience is a universally recog-
nized norm. The United States, because of its history, has a special obli-
gation to be true to this standard. The United States proclaimed that it
was founded on such liberty, welcomed people of every faith to its
shores (regrettable aberrations notwithstanding), and promised their pro-
tection under its laws. The United States, which played a leading role in
the inception of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, should
strive to be an exemplar of the liberty envisioned in it.
The most recent tragic aberration, Executive Order 13780 of March 6,
2017, a travel ban that has been brought before the Supreme Court, sus-
pends immigration from six predominantly Muslim countries, and im-
poses special requirements on immigrants from a seventh, Iraq.165 I
joined with other international law scholars in an amicus curiae brief
filed with the Supreme Court, challenging President Trump’s ban on
travel from the selected countries.166 The brief cites the supremacy
clause of the Constitution, the UDHR, the ICCPR, the American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man,167 The Paquete Habana, and
other authorities.
It was the intent of the Framers that the Constitution be understood to
require that the President adhere to the requirements of both customary
international law and treaty law.168 It was hoped that the Supreme Court
will reject the travel ban that was created to keep people of predomi-
nantly Muslim countries from America’s shores. It is hard to imagine a
more un-American policy. The United States is, after all, a nation of
immigrants.
The travel ban was upheld by the high court in a sharply divided 5-4
decision in Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (June 26, 2018). The majority
ironically used dicta to overturn Koromatsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
165. Brief of International Law Scholars and Nongovernmental Organizations as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. ___ (brief
filed on March 30, 2018) (Nos. 16-1436 (16A1190) and 16-1540 (16A1191)) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief] (on file with author).
166. Id.
167. American Declaration, supra note 113.
168. Id. at 7 (citing Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793)), reprinted in THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 33-43 (Harold C. Syrett, ed., 1969). See also U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8 (“the law of nations”) and art. IV, cl. 2 (“treaties made, or which shall be made”).
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214 (1944), which had found wartime internment of Japanese Americans
constitutional. Of more practical and tragic significance, the court
now upheld President Trump’s anti-Muslim travel ban.
A future Supreme Court, or a future Congress, should overturn the
Trump v. Hawaii anti-Muslim travel ban.
President Dwight Eisenhower told American Muslims in 1957, “Indeed,
America would fight with her whole strength for your right to have here
your own church and worship according to your own conscience.”169
John F. Kennedy, as a presidential candidate in 1960, said government
should not be used by a religious group “to compel, prohibit, or persecute
the free exercise of any other religion. And that goes for any persecution,
at any time, by anyone, in any country.”170
The aspiration for religious liberty, to be guaranteed by a secular state,
arose in the American colonies before the Revolution. As Judge Carlos
Bea of the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals wrote:
Before the American Revolution, the colonists objected to the
Anglican Church’s control over worship. The Anglican Church,
an arm of England, required the use of the King James Bible
and forced adherence to Anglican doctrine. The first Congress
did not want the federal government to establish a federal
church, so they approved an amendment forbidding it from do-
ing so.171
Roger Williams, Puritan minister and founder of Rhode Island, said other
religions – “Jewes, Turks, or Antichristians” – do not offend against the
civil state or peace.172
The Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1776, declared:
The religion, or the duty which we owe to our CREATOR and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
169. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Speech at the Opening of the Islamic Center Mosque in
Washington, D.C. (June 28, 1957), available at https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/quotes/dwight-
eisenhower-on-muslims-in-america-at-ceremonies-opening-the-islamic-center.
170. Senator John F. Kennedy, Campaign Address at the Houston Ministerial Association (Sept.
12, 1960), available at http://www.brighteningglance.org/jfk-address-to-the-greater-houston-minis
terial-association-12-september-1960-html.
171. Hon. Bea, supra note 73.
172. Roger Williams (1644), quoted in DENISE A. SPELLBERG, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S QUUR’AN
41 (2013) (ital. in original).
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conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to
practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each
other.173
James Madison in 1803 wrote to the U.S. general consul in Algiers:
The universal toleration in matters of religion in most States,
and the entire want of a power respecting them in the general
Government, has as we understand induced the Barbary powers,
to view us more favorably than other Christian nations, who are
exclusively so, and with whom these powers consider them-
selves in perpetual hostility.174
Early United States treaties signed with Algiers175 allowed consuls and
other public agents in the territory of the other state to exercise their
religion in their own houses. Treaties with Tripoli176 provided that “no
pretext arising from religious opinions” should interfere with harmony
between the two states – a treaty with Tripoli in 1796 said the Govern-
ment of the United States “is not in any sense founded on the Christian
religion,” and a treaty in 1805 disclaimed for the United States any en-
mity against the “laws, religion or tranquility of the Musselmen.”177
A surprisingly illuminating encounter took place when the Tunisian am-
bassador was in Washington at the same time as Native Americans were
there negotiating treaties with the United States.178 The Indians made a
courtesy call on Ambassador Sidi Suleyman Mellimelli, who then asked
them what God they worship.179
The Minister asked them what God they worshipped. The Indi-
ans answered The Great Spirit. He then asked them if they be-
173. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 14; THE STATUTES AT LARGE, IX 109-112
(William W. Hening, ed. 1890-1923) (caps in original), available at http://www.history.org/al-
manack/life/politics/varights.cfm.
174. Secretary of State James Madison to Tobias Lear, Consul General, Algiers, July 14, 1803,
in NAVAL DOCUMENTS, 2:485, cited in DENISE A. SPELLBERG, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S QUUR’AN 209
(2013).
175. 1795 art. XVII, 1815 art. XV, and 1816, art. 15, cited in ROBERT RENBERT WILSON,
UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (1960).
176. Id. at 1796 art. XI and 1805 art. XIV.
177. Id.
178. DENISE A. SPELLBERG, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S QUUR’AN 41, 221 (2013)
179. Id.
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lieved in Mohamed, Abraham, or Jesus Christ? They answered
neither. He then asked what prophet do you worship. They re-
plied none. We worship the Great Spirit without an agent.180
Thomas Jefferson wrote, “The legitimate powers of government extend
to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for
my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no God. It neither picks my
pocket nor breaks my leg.”181 John Locke, whose writing influenced the
American Founders, wrote that “Jews, Mohometans, and Pagans” do not
forfeit civil rights of the commonwealth under English law.182 Jefferson
wrote notes in his copy of Locke’s treatise, A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION (1689) – quoting Locke’s words, “neither Pagan nor
Mohamaden nor Jew ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the
Commonwealth because of his religion.”183
American Founders across the political spectrum were conscious of di-
versity of the world’s religions. Jefferson, the first Democratic-Republi-
can president, had purchased a copy of “Sale’s Koran,” an English
translation of the Qur’an, in 1765.184 John Adams, the first Federalist
president, had bought a copy of the Qur’an in 1806.185
American revolutionaries were inspired by the Whig view of individual
rights,186 which were set to verse by an Anglican bishop’s son, John
Hoadley:187
No clergy here usurp the free-born mind,
Ordained to teach, and not enslave mankind;
Religion here bids persecution cease,
Without, all order, and within, all Peace
Religion to be Sacred must be free;
Men will suspect – where bigots keep the key.188
180. Memorandum from U.S. Sen. William Plummer (Federalist-N.H.), quoted in SPELLBERG,
supra note 178, at 221.
181. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS 254 [hereinafter
Notes on Virginia], quoted in SPELLBERG, supra note 178, at 112.
182. John Locke (1692), quoted in SPELLBERG, supra note 178, at 41.
183. Notes on Virginia, supra note 181, at 106-07.
184. SPELLBERG, supra note 178, at 89.
185. Id. at 155.
186. Id. at 30.
187. Id. at 31.
188. Prologue, Voltaire, Mahomet the Impostor, adapted by James Miller & John Hoadly
(London, J. Watts & B. Dod 1744), quoted in SPELLBERG, supra note 178, at 31 (popular stage play
and book by the time of the American Revolution).
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XI. CONCLUSION
People of every religion and belief system, and those who claim to have
no beliefs, have the right to be treated equally, everywhere in the world.
This fundamental right legally is enforceable under the customary law of
nations and under multinational agreements. People of all faiths are not
equal if the precepts and practices of one faith are adopted by the state
itself (though this corollary is not conceded by some nations). The right
of any person to wear a headscarf, crucifix, Star of David or other sym-
bol of faith does not interfere with the legitimate rights of anyone else.
To say that “public order” is imperiled if a woman wears a headscarf is
analogous to saying neighbors will riot if a Black Muslim buys a house.
Every person has the right to subscribe to the code that conscience dic-
tates, and to engage in peaceful practices or wear ornaments that pose no
harm to others. The wearing of a religious or peace sign is not to be
equated, however, with the wearing of a sign that advocates violence
against Jews or anyone else. The international norm and accordingly mu-
nicipal law should be interpreted to protect the peaceful practice of one’s
faith, including the wearing of ornaments that express no hostility to
anyone.
Although the early development of international law derived largely
from religious ideas, it is needful to have a secular state to protect the
freedom of religion, belief, and conscience for all people. To be enforced
in good faith, the obligatory customs and conventions that protect these
freedoms must be interpreted and applied in a reasonable manner. Civil-
ian and military officials should be familiar with international agree-
ments and General Assembly declarations that contain provisions having
relevance to their areas of responsibility, such as provisions concerning
noncombatants, migrant workers, women, and children.
Creative efforts need to be undertaken to enlist the international judiciary
– at the global and regional levels – to address hate crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and other acts of violence against religious minorities.
The rights of sincere conscientious objectors, including those who selec-
tively object to military actions that violate an upright conscience, should
be respected consistently. Proclaiming religious liberty while denying the
right of a conscript to refuse to bomb a populated city is analogous to
declaring “all men are created equal. . .with certain unalienable rights”
while engaging in the slave trade.
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Religious minorities should be allowed exemption from facially neutral
laws that materially interfere with religious freedom. It would be reason-
able to outlaw use of marijuana without a physician’s prescription, but
the Native American tribe whose members for generations have used cer-
emonial peyote should be allowed a special exception.
The United States Supreme Court should cite international law as well as
the Constitution when rendering decisions in cases that implicate the
freedom of religion.
The United States should embrace anew the dimly remembered or for-
gotten heritage of America’s Founders who believed in the rights of con-
science and the law of nations.
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